虞之道 (The Way of Tang and Yu);5 "Zhongxin zhi dao" 忠信之道 (The Way of integrity and trustworthiness); and the four untitled miscellanies known as "Yucong" 語叢 (Collections of sayings).6 I believe that these works should be understood as doctrinal material deriving from a single tradition of Confucianism and datable to around 300 b.c. of the surviving literature from the same period, they are closer to the Xunzi 荀子 than to any other text, and indeed anticipate several significant ideas in Xunzi's philosophy.7 It is especially important for scholars to take note of these connections with Xunzi, in view of the emerging trend to associate the Guodian manuscripts with Zisi 子思,8 the famous grandson of Confucius, whom Xunzi bitterly criticized.
These newfound Confucian texts contain a number of core ideas that distinguish them clearly from Mencian Confucianism, and suggest the existence of a vibrant non-Mencian tradition of Confucianism that culminated in Xunzi's system of moral philosophy. Before the discovery of the Guodian tomb, there was little evidence concerning Xunzi's intellectual antecedents, but it is apparent now that the Guodian manuscripts anticipate several characteristic themes in Xunzi's philosophy: the notion of "human nature" (xing 性), including the controversy over whether the source of morality is "internal" or "external"; the role of "learning" (xue 學) and "habitual practice" (xi 習) in moral development; the content and origin of "ritual" (li 禮), by which human beings accord with the Way; the conception of the ruler as the "mind" (xin 心) of the state; and the psychological utility of "music" (yue 樂) in inculcating proper values. Each of these subjects will be addressed below.
one caveat before proceeding: for a number of reasons, the Guodian manuscripts are among the most difficult texts yet excavated. First, the writing of the Chinese characters presents more epigraphic problems than that of manuscripts recently excavated at sites such as Mawangdui 馬王堆. The manuscripts contain dozens of opaque graphs, including many which simply cannot be deciphered (so-called daikao zi 待考字).9 Second, while the bamboo strips are well preserved, there are several lacunae, some of which occur, frustratingly, at crucial junctures in the argument of the texts. Finally, and most importantly, the texts had to be reconstructed strip by strip (since they were found, in the words of one Chinese expert, "in a pile"),10 and determining the correct sequence is often a matter of educated guesswork. Consequently, the current arrange ment of the material is often questionable.
For these reasons, the analysis and translations presented below are necessarily tentative. We can only hope that with more intensive study, part of the Zisizi in a memorial recorded in "Yinyue shang" 音樂上, Suishu 隋書 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1979), 13.288. However, these points do not convince Cheng Yuanmin 程 元敏, "Liji 'Zhongyong,' 'Fangji,' 'Ziyi' fei chu yu Zisizi kao" 禮記中庸坊記緇衣非出 於子思子考, in Zhang Yiren xiansheng qizhi shouqing lunwenji 張以仁先生七秩壽慶論 文集 (Taipei: Xuesheng, 1999), vol. 1, 30-32, who argues that Shen Yue was mistaken, and that the ostensible parallels between "Ziyi" and Zisizi are merely repetitions of common Confucian aphorisms.
Other Mainland scholars associate the Guodian manuscripts with Mencian Confucianism; see Pang Pu 龐朴, "Chudu Guodian Chujian" 初讀郭店楚簡, Lishi yanjiu 歷 史研究 1998.4, 6.
9. To date, the most comprehensive study of the graphs used in the manuscripts is Cheung Kwong-yue 張光裕, Guodian Chujian yanjiu 郭店楚簡研究 (Taipei: Yee Wen, 1999-), vol. 1. 10. Private communication from Professor Xu Shaohua, Wuhan university.
and with the eventual publication of the early Confucian texts housed at the Shanghai Museum,11 our understanding of the Guodian manuscripts will improve.
Xing and Morality
Famously, Xunzi believes that human nature is "evil"(e 惡)-by which he means that human beings naturally wish only to satisfy their appetitive and concupiscent desires. He is also famous for his distinctive use of the term xing, which is unlike that encountered, for example, in the Mencius 孟子. For Xunzi, xing means "what is so by birth" (生之所以然 者),12 or everything which we possess without having exerted any effort to obtain it. For Mencius, on the other hand, xing represents the natural course of development which an organism may be expected to undergo given nourishing conditions-as has been persuasively demonstrated in a classic study by A.C. Graham.13 This is no trivial point, because Xunzi's attempted refutation of Mencius is based on an understanding of the keyword xing that Mencius would not have accepted. The consequence of this difference in usage, as Dai Zhen 戴震 (1724-1777) pointed out, is that Xunzi uses xing to denote the characteristic that all members of a species have in common, whereas Mencius uses the term to denote the characteristic that distinguishes a species from all others.14 (To use a 11. there is a preliminary account of this material in Cao Feng 曹峰, "Shanhai hakubutsukan tenji no Sokan ni tsuite" 上海博物館展示の楚簡について, Kakuten Sokan no shisōteki kenkyū 郭店楚簡の思想史的研究 (Tokyo university) 2 (1999), 122-40. 12. Wang Xianqian 王先謙 (1842- 14. dai zhen, Mengzi ziyi shuzheng 孟子字義疏證, ed. He Wenguang 何文光, 2d ed. (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1982), B.25 ("Xing" 性); cf. Goldin, Rituals of the Way, 12-13. incidentally, cheng Yi 程頤 (1033-1107) also observed that Mencius's use of the term xing was different from that of Gaozi 告子 (discussed below). See Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200), ed., Henan Chengshi yishu 河南程氏遺書 (Guoxue jiben congshu 國學基本叢 書 ed.), 18.229. Cheng Yi was referring to a peculiar Neo-Confucian dichotomy between the "fundamental xing" (性之本), which corresponds to the principle of the universe, and the "physical xing" (性質之性), which is the imperfect human form made up of qi 氣. But since neither Mencius nor Gaozi (nor Xunzi, for that matter) makes such a distinction, Cheng Yi cannot really be said to have identified the salient difference in usage. modern example, all human beings have brains, but having brains does not distinguish human beings from all other species.)
The Guodian manuscripts consistently use xing in the same sense as Xunzi:
四海之內其性一也。其用心各異，教使然也。
Within the four seas, [everyone's] xing is the same. That they use their minds differently is caused by teaching.15 聖人之性與中人之性，其生而未有非之節於天也，則猶是也… 此以民皆有性而聖人不可莫也。 the xing of a sage and the xing of a mediocre person are without exception regulated by Heaven16 at birth; thus they are as they are. . . . Therefore the people all have xing, and a Sage cannot be without17 one.18
None of the Guodian manuscripts state explicitly that human xing is evil,19 but it is evident that they regularly understand the xing to be 15. "Xing zi ming chu," strip 9; Guodian Chumu zhujian, 179. All translations in this article are my own. My practice will be to accept silently the palaeographical interpretations suggested by the editors, except where otherwise noted. Compare this passage to Xunzi jijie, "Quanxue" 勸學, 1.2: "The children of Gan, Yue, Yi, and Mo all make the same sounds when born, but grow up to have different customs; teaching makes this so" (干、越、夷、貉之子，生而同聲，長而異俗，教使之然也). This idea probably goes back to Analects 17.2: "[People's] xing are close to one another; practice makes them distant from one another" (性相近也，習相遠也); see Cheng Shude 程樹 德 (1877-1944), Lunyu jishi 論語集釋, ed. Cheng Junying 程俊英 and Jiang Jianyuan 蔣見元 (Xinbian zhuzi jicheng ed.; Beijing: Zhonghua, 1990), 34.1177.
16. for the reading of this character as tian 天, see chen ning 陳寧, "Guodian Chumu zhujian zhong de Rujia renxing yanlun chutan" 郭店楚墓竹簡中的儒家人性言論初探, Zhongguo zhexue shi 中國哲學史 1998.4, 39. But scholars disagree as to the interpretation of the entire phrase. For example, Zhou Fengwu 周鳳五, "Guodian Chujian shizi zhaji" 郭店楚簡識字札記, Zhang Yiren xiansheng qizhi shouqing lunwenji, vol. 1, 357-58, suggests that it should read其生而未有分也，節於爾也 (I think this yields a less satisfactory sense); on the other hand, Li Ling, "Guodian Chujian jiaodu ji," 515, proposes 其生而 未有非志，次於此也，則猶是也.
17. Qiu Xigui 裘錫圭, Guodian Chumu zhujian, 170n.28, suspects that the character mo 莫 should be read as mu 慕, thus: "the Sages cannot be venerated [on account of their xing]."
18. "Cheng zhi wen zhi," strips 26-28; Guodian Chumu zhujian, 168. Compare Xunzi jijie, "Xing'e" 性惡, 17.438: "That by which the Sage is the same as the populace, and is not different from the populace, is his xing" (故聖人之所以同於眾，其不異於眾 者，性也).
19. The phrase haowu, xing ye 好惡，性也 ("Xing zi ming chu," strip 4; Guodian Chumu zhujian, 179), might at first glance be translated as "love of evil is xing"; but it is clear from the next clause-suohao suowu, wu ye 所好所惡，物也 ("what are liked or disliked are objects")-that haowu here must mean "liking and disliking." Cf. Chen naturally deficient of "morality" (義), which must be attained from "outside" (外). In this respect, the conception of xing in the guodian manuscripts could hardly come closer to that of Xunzi. "Xing zi ming chu" explains that our inborn nature is revealed spontaneously in our responses to the stimuli around us, and that it is not naturally moral. We must strive to "bring morality inside ourselves":
出之，知義者能內之。 although everyone has a xing, the mind has no fixed will. It becomes operative only after [it encounters] objects; it becomes active only after [it encounters] pleasure; it becomes fixed only after habitual practice. The qi of happiness, anger, grief, and sorrow is the xing. Once it is apparent externally, objects take hold of it. The xing emerges from the endowment; the endowment is sent down from Heaven. The Way begins in the one's responses to reality (qing);20 one's responses to reality are born of one's xing. At first, one stays close to one's responses to reality; in the end, one stays close to morality. Those who know their responses to reality know how to express them; those who know morality know how to bring it inside themselves.21
In other words, when presented with external stimuli, we exhibit our qing 情, our "responses to reality," which are simply a manifestation of our unsettled internal state. "Knowing one's qing" is identified here as a crucial first step towards moral development (and elsewhere, as we shall see, "Xing zi ming chu" emphasizes the importance of speaking in Lai 陳來, "Jingmen zhujian zhi 'Xing zi ming chu' pian chutan" 荊門竹簡之性自命出 篇初探, Zhongguo zhexue 20 (1999), 295-96.
20. for this translation of qing 情, see chad hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation (New York and Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1992), 405n.14. The "correct" meaning of qing (which is also commonly understood either as "essence" or "emotion") is the subject of much scholarly controversy and cannot be considered in depth here. I have supported a meaning along the lines of "essence" (Goldin, Rituals of the Way, 112n.2), but am persuaded that Hansen's "reality response" works far better for texts such as "Xing zi ming chu." See also Hansen's "Qing (Emotions) 情 in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought This last statement must be astonishing to any student of Chinese philosophy, because it is attributed to the philosopher Gaozi 告子 in a debate recorded in the Mencius. The consequences of this association will be discussed presently. For now, let us observe that this idea, namely that morality must be obtained from outside the self, is common to Gaozi, Xunzi, and the Guodian manuscripts-and to virtually no other known members of the Confucian school.
Learning and the Canons
Xunzi postulates that, despite our natural evil, we can improve ourselves , namely by what he calls "learning" 學; that includes studying the canonical texts handed down by the ancient Sages-the Rites 禮, the Music 樂, the Odes 詩, the Documents 書, and the Springs and Autumns 春 秋, which incorporate the principles of the entire universe.
《禮》之敬文也，《樂》之中和也，《詩》、《書》之博也， 《春秋》之微也，在天地之閒者畢矣。
22. "Yucong yi," strips 22-23; Guodian Chumu zhujian, 194. The preceding section appears to be missing a strip, but it is clear that the subject of discussion is the same: "Of the Way of Humanity, some [components] emerge from inside, some enter from outside. What emerges from inside is humanity, integrity, and trustworthiness; from. . . ." (人之 道也，或由中出，或由外入。由中出者，仁、忠、信。由)-and here the text breaks off. One would be tempted, on the basis of "Liude" (discussed below), to assume that the virtues which enter from outside are morality (義), wisdom (智), and sagehood (聖). However, sagehood and wisdom correspond in that text to the father (父) and the husband (夫), respectively, and those roles are understood there to be "internal" (內) social roles. Thus the division of virtues (in "Yucong" and other texts) into "internal" and "external" does not correspond with the division of social roles into "internal" and "external" in "Liude." The two arrangements agree only that humanity is internal and morality external.
23. "Liude," strip 26; Guodian Chumu zhujian, 188.
The reverence and refinement of the Rites, the centrality and har- 26. The graph in the manuscript is , which the editors tentatively interpreted as feng 逢. For the reading ge 格 "active," see Chen Ning, "Guodian Chumu zhujian zhong de Rujia," 41-42. Li Ling, "Guodian Chujian jiaodu ji," 508, suggests ni 逆 (which, I suppose, would mean "lead astray" in this context), but ge here, understood as a causative of xing 行, recalls the earlier statement (see citation in n. 21 above) that the xing becomes active (行) in response to pleasure. Later in the present passage, the graph recurs with xun 訓; Chen Ning interprets the compound as gexun 格訓 "restrain and instruct"; Li Ling as nishun 逆順. 27. This is apparently a parenthetical gloss informing the initiated reader that "the Way" is to be understood as "the Way of Humanity." I do not know precisely what is meant by the "other three techniques," and do not believe that they are explained in the Guodian corpus.
28. "Xing zi ming chu," strips 12-18; Guodian Chumu zhujian, 179. 29. "Liude," strips 24-25; Guodian Chumu zhujian, 188. 30. for the reading zhi 志 (the editors of Guodian Chumu zhujian, 200n.6, suggest either zhi or shi 詩), see Liao Mingchun, "Cong Jingmen Chujian lun xian-Qin Rujia," 311.
31. "Yucong yi," strips 37-41; Guodian Chumu zhujian, 194-95. The text goes on to include the Rites, Music, and Documents in the canonical group. Li Ling, "Guodian "Xing zi ming chu," in particular, presents a scheme very much like that of Xunzi: we use the Way to "augment" (長) our inborn xing, and an intensive study of the canonical classics is recommended as one of the best methods of attaining the Way.32
Heaven, the Way, and Ritual
Xunzi argues that the Sages established "ritual and morality" 禮義 in order to bring about harmonious society:
禮起於何也? 曰﹕人生而有欲，欲而不得，則不能無求，求而 無度量分界，則不能不爭，爭則亂，亂則窮。先王惡其亂也， 故制禮義以分之，以養人之欲，給人之求，使欲必不窮乎物， 物必不屈於欲，兩者相持而長，是禮之所起也。 Whence did rituals arise? I say: People are born with desires; if they desire and do not obtain [the object of their desires], then they cannot but seek it. If, in seeking, people have no measures or limits, then there cannot but be contention. Contention makes disorder, and disorder privation. The Former Kings hated such dis order, and established ritual and morality in order to divide [the people's responsibilities], in order to nourish people's desires and grant what people seek. They brought it about that desires need not be deprived of objects, that objects need not be depleted by desires; the two support each other and grow: this is where rituals arise from.33
Chujian jiaodu ji," 536, argues that the editors of Guodian Chumu zhujian have jumbled the original order of the classics in this passage.
32. Incidentally, some recent unpublished conference papers have suggested that the Guodian manuscripts are speaking here of proto-textual "traditions," rather than actual canonical texts, but the two references to the Springs and Autumns are good evidence that these are indeed to be understood as texts largely as we have received them. I am not aware of any oral tradition of the Springs and Autumns. Yuri Pines, for example, has suggested provocatively in "Intellectual Change in the Chunqiu Period: The Reliability of the Speeches in the Zuo Zhuan as Sources of Chunqiu Intellectual History," Early China 22 (1997), 82-86, that the received Springs and Autumns derives from ritualistic reports to ancestral spirits inscribed on ce 策 (large bamboo strips)-in other words, that the Chunqiu was a written text from the time of its inception. Moreover, Gilbert L. Mattos (private communication) observes: "The Guodian texts make frequent reference to these [classical] texts, which must already have existed in 'book form' well before the time of the deceased's death. Yet at the same time we find discrepancies between them and the received texts. But they are similar enough to suggest that there were competing editions at that time." See also Guo Qiyong 郭齊勇, "Guodian Rujia jian de yiyi yu jiazhi" 郭店儒家簡的意義與價值, Hubei Daxue xuebao (Zhexue shehui kexue ban) 1999.2, 6; and Liao Mingchun, "Cong Jingmen Chujian lun xian-Qin Rujia," 310-14.
33. Xunzi jijie, "Lilun" 禮論, 13.346. Compare the translation in Knoblock, Xunzi, "Ritual and morality" also help people overcome their evil natures and become good: 今人之性惡，必將待聖王之治，禮義之化，然後皆出於治，合 於禮也。 Since people's natures are evil, they must await the governance of the Sage Kings, the transformation of ritual and morality-then everything emerges with government and is in accord with ritual.34
Where Xunzi appears to be most original, however-or more precisely, where he appeared to be most original before the discovery of the Guodian manuscripts-is in his insistence that only the rituals of the Sage Kings can bring about harmonious society and personal self-cultiva tion in this manner, because only the rituals of the Sage Kings conform to the essential characteristics of humanity that distinguish us from all other species. In referring to the distinguishing characteristics of the human species, Xunzi does not use the word xing (which, as we have seen, denotes in his parlance the characteristics that all humans naturally share), but the expression ren zhi suoyi wei ren zhe 人之所以為人者 "that by which humans are human": bipeds]. It is their making of distinctions. Now the xingxing ape35 resembles us,36 and also has two feet and no pelt. But the noble man sips his soup and eats his food cooked. Thus what makes humans human is not specifically that they have two feet and no pelt. It is their making of distinctions. Birds and beasts have fathers and sons, but no affection between fathers and sons. They have males and females, but no separation between men and women. Thus the Way of Humanity is nothing other than to make distinctions. There are no greater distinctions than social distinctions. There are no greater social distinctions than rituals. There are no greater rituals than those of the Sage Kings.37
In other words, the rituals are right because they embody the Way of Humanity 人道, and not merely because the Sages dictated them. Other systems of social control-such as law codes established by human rulers-cannot bring about the same results, because they do not necessarily accord with the Way. The consequence of this view, which scholars have not always appreciated, is that for Xunzi, the Way is paramount, not the rituals-for it is the Way that determines the rituals. This was the philosophical position that I deduced from Xunzi's writings in Rituals of the Way; at the time, I considered it quite revolutionary within the Confucian school.38
It is noteworthy, therefore, that one finds much the same view presented in the Guodian manuscripts: The last passage, in particular, reveals that the Guodian manuscripts conceive of a cosmological dao much like that of Xunzi-and that this dao functions as the appropriate pattern for human interaction on earth.45 The rituals, similarly, are conditioned by human xing, which is also imparted directly from Heaven: "The xing emerges from the endowment ; the endowment is sent down from Heaven" (性自命出，命自 天降).46 43. for the reading zuo 作, see Li Ling, "Guodian Chujian jiaodu ji," 515. The character is interpreted as zhu 著 in Guodian Chumu zhujian.
44. "Cheng zhi wen zhi," strips 31-33; Guodian Chumu zhujian, 168. Compare also "Zun deyi," strips 5-6; Guodian Chumu zhujian, 173: "Yu ordered his people in accordance with the Way of Humanity; Jie disordered his people in accordance with the Way of Humanity. Jie did not change Yu's people before he could disorder them; Tang did not change Jie's people before he could order them. The Sage orders the people by means of the Way of the people" (禹以人道治其民，桀以人道亂其民。桀不易禹民 而後亂之，湯不易桀民而後治之。聖人之治民，民之道也).
45. See Li Zehou, "Chudu Guodian zhujian," 412-13. 46. "Xing zi ming chu," strips 2-3; Guodian Chumu zhujian, 179.
The Ruler as the "Mind" of the People
Xunzi posits an analogy between polity and personhood. Political states, he argues, are made up of two parts: their initial resources and the policies that their rulers elect to follow. It is Xunzi's conviction that a state's initial resources play no appreciable role in its ultimate success or failure; all that matters are the ruler and his decision to follow-or not to follow-the rituals. Similarly, people are also made up of two parts: the xing that they are born with, and their conduct-or, in his language, their "artifice" (偽). Like the policies of a state, the "artifice" of a human being must conform to the rituals to be successful. But like a state's initial resources, the evil xing plays no role in determining our ultimate success or failure as human beings; all that matters are the mind and its decision to follow-or not to follow-the Way.47
Xunzi articulates this view in a number of passages found throughout his book. He affirms that a state's initial power is irrelevant to its prospects for success by pointing out that "a state of one hundred li is sufficient to establish autonomy" (百里之國，足以獨立矣).48 This is because a sage ruler can defend himself against his enemies by following the rituals: and instructs them, attunes and unifies them, then the soldiers will be firm and the fortifications secure; enemy states will dare not close in. As for the state-there is also a "sharpening with a whetstone." This is ritual and morality, and restrictions [enacted] in due measure.51
With such decisive influence over the complexion of his state, the lord is the absolute standard of conduct: 君者，儀也，儀正而景正；君者，槃也，槃圓而水圓；君者， 盂也，盂方而水方。 The lord is the sundial; if the sundial is straight, the shadow is straight. The lord is the bowl; if the bowl is round, the water is round. The lord is the basin; if the basin is square, the water is square.52
Many of the sayings in "Ziyi" display a similar spirit: The last passage is repeated verbatim in "Zun deyi,"56 and alluded to repeatedly by several of the Guodian texts, as in the following:
this is not to suggest that the Guodian manuscripts were in any respect original in saying that a ruler's likes and dislikes necessarily influence the populace's emulous behavior. By 300 b.c., this was a well-worn theme in Chinese philosophy that was routinely used even by non-Confucian writers.58 But the statement in "Ziyi" that the people take the ruler as their mind is nonetheless striking. After all, in Xunzi's philoso phy, the role of the mind in human self-cultivation is perfectly analogous to that of the ruler in the government of a state.59 Perhaps Xunzi deliberately alluded to "Ziyi" while expounding his philosophy of mind. The Guodian manuscripts agree that an indispensable component of the ruler's behavior consists of his utterances, both verbal and musical. These must reflect his sincere will, so as to present a worthy model for the people to follow, as we read in "Xing zi ming chu": 凡聲，其出於情也信，然後其入撥人心也厚。 As for sounds generally, if they emerge in a trustworthy manner from the qing, then they will enter and stir up people's hearts profoundly.60 求其心有偽也，弗得之矣。人之不能以偽也，可知也。 if one seeks the mind [of the people] with artifice, one will not obtain it. We know that people cannot be [persuaded?]61 with artifice.62 this usage of wei 為/偽 must remind us of Xunzi's tenet: "The principle of ritual is to make manifest what is genuine and to eliminate what is fake" (著誠去偽，禮之經也).63 The idea of "entering and stirring up people's hearts" (入撥人心) in "Xing zi ming chu" brings us to our next topic.
Music
Another fundamental idea in Xunzi's philosophy pertains to music: 60. "Xing zi ming chu," strip 23; Guodian Chumu zhujian, 180. 61. There seems to be a character missing here. 62. "Xing zi ming chu," strips 36-37; Guodian Chumu zhujian, 180. 63. Xunzi jijie, "Yuelun" 樂論, 14.382. This pejorative sense of wei 偽 can be confusing, since Xunzi normally employs the term to denote the good "artifice" that transforms one's evil xing. 不流，使其文足以辨而不諰，使其曲直、繁省、廉肉、節奏足 以感動人之善心，使夫邪汙之氣無由得接焉。 Music is joy; it is what humans cannot avoid in their qing. Thus humans cannot be without music. If we are joyous, then we must express it in sounds and tones and give form to it in movement and quietude. And the Way of Humanity is fulfilled in sounds and tones, in movement and quietude, and in the changes in the techniques of the xing.64 Thus humans cannot be without joy, and joy cannot be without form, but if that form is not [in accord with] the Way, then there cannot but be disorder. The Former Kings hated this disorder; thus they instituted the sounds of the Elegantiae and Hymns in order to make them dao. They brought it about that their sounds were sufficient [to give form] to joy but were not dissipated; they brought it about that their patterned [compositions] were sufficient to make distinctions but were not timorous;65 they brought it about that the directness, complexity, richness, and rhythm were sufficient to move people's good minds; they brought it about that heterodox and impure qi would have no opportunity to attach itself.66 This is one of the most important passages in the history of Chinese aesthetics, because it brings together similar ideas that had been expressed in earlier sources (such as the Zuozhuan 左傳),67 but organizes these into the most comprehensive explanation of the origins of music in the irrepressible human urge to express emotions. Xunzi's framework was then adopted wholesale by such later works as the "Great 64. This statement is difficult to construe, and there is a conspicuous lack of commentary about it. Perhaps Xunzi means to say that music ("sounds and tones, movement and quietude") is a technique for improving the xing and thus fulfilling the Way of Humanity; this would be in line with his general views.
65. unlike most commentators, I prefer not to emend xi 諰 "timorous" here. See also the commentary of Hao Yixing. Coincidentally, cong 謥, which is another possible reading (xi and cong are easily confused because of their graphic similarity), has a comparable meaning.
66 preface" 大序 to the Odes and the "Yueji" 樂記 chapter of the Record of Rites (Liji 禮記). Xunzi's primary motive in composing this essay was to refute Mozi's notorious argument that music is wasteful;68 on the contrary, Xunzi claims, music is essential to the project of moral transformation , because music that conforms to the Way can influence human beings and lead them to morality.
Essentially the same scheme is at work in the account of music in "Xing zi ming chu":
As for sounds generally, if they emerge in a trustworthy manner from the qing, then they will enter and stir up people's hearts profoundly. When one hears the sound of laughter, one will be as though refreshed and thus happy. When one hears singing and chanting, one will be as though jolly and thus excited. When one listens to the sounds of the lute and cithern, one will be as though perturbed69 and thus full of sighs. When one observes the Lai and Wu dances, one will be as though even-tempered and thus creative.70 When one observes the Shao and Xia dances, one will be as though assid uous and thus frugal.71
Where Xunzi recommends the Elegantiae and Hymns (雅頌), "Xing zi ming chu" extols the power of the Lai, Wu, Shao, and Xia dances (賚 武韶夏).72 But effectively, these all refer to the same kind of musical compositions that were handed down by the Sages for the purpose of inspiring human beings to embody the virtues conveyed in them. To be sure, Xunzi's essay explains this process much more clearly than "Xing zi ming chu"-but once again, the essential components of Xunzi's philosophical position seem to be anticipated by the Guodian manuscripts.
Possible Allusions to the Guodian Manuscripts in Xunzi's Writings
There is some evidence that Xunzi may have intended to refer (or at least allude) to the Guodian texts in his own writings.
Since the discovery of "Wuxing" at Mawangdui, it has become clear that Xunzi had this same tradition in mind-if not this very text-when he criticized Mencius and Zisi for "pretending that they were following early precedents in inventing their propositions, calling them the Five Xing" (案往舊造說，謂之五行).73 as early as a. The Guodian text "Qiongda yi shi" represents a parallel account of a story told in the Xunzi about Confucius's difficulties while traveling between the states of Chen and Cai.77 in a recent study of the several "between Chen and Cai" stories in the ancient literature, John Makeham78 has suggested that the account in the Xunzi may be the oldest version of a narrative cycle based on the brief notice in Analects 15.2:
在陳絕糧，從者病，莫能興。子路慍見曰﹕君子亦有窮乎? 子 曰﹕君子固窮，小人窮斯濫矣。 When they were in Chen, they ran out of grain; the followers became ill, and none could get up. Zilu's resentment showed, and he said: "Does the noble man also encounter hard times?" The Master said: "The noble man is firm in hard times; when the lesser man falls on hard times, he is washed away."79 It has been assumed until recently that the oldest mention of the famous phrase shen qi du 慎其獨 ("cautious when alone" or "cautious about one's independence"-an attribute of the moral junzi) was in Xunzi jijie, "Bugou" 不苟, 2.46, and that its appearance in such texts as "Wuxing" and Liji, "Zhongyong" 中庸, could be traced back to this usage; cf. Jeffrey Riegel, "Eros, Introversion, and the Beginnings of Shijing Commentary," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 57.1 (1997), 165-66. (For a less widely cited appearance of the phrase, see also Liji zhengyi, "Liqi" 禮器, 23.1434b.) With the discovery of the Guodian "Wuxing" and the appearance of the phrase in two places in that text (strips 16-18; Guodian Chumu zhujian, 149-50), it is clear now that Xunzi must have borrowed the phrase from a source such as "Wuxing," and not vice versa. The language of the passage from "Bugou" (with its emphasis on xing 形, or giving the proper internal form to one's de 德) is reminiscent of "Wuxing" (as well as "Zhong yong"), and may represent a youthful Xunzi's attempts to come to grips with this earlier Confucian tradition. See Goldin, Rituals of the Way, 19-20. On the other hand, John H. Knoblock, "The Chronology of Xunzi's Works," Early China 8 (1982-83), 28-52, considers "Bugou" to be one of Xunzi's last works.
77. The story appears in Xunzi jijie, "Youzuo" 宥坐, 20.526-28. Doubts about the authenticity of this chapter go back to Yang Liang, who attributed it to Xunzi's disciples; see his commentary at Xunzi jijie, 20.520. (See also Zhang Xincheng, Weishu tongkao, vol. 2, 738.) Knoblock, Xunzi, vol. 3, 237-38, presents the attractive argument that "Youzuo" is part of a corpus of traditional materials which Xunzi selected as a "proper curriculum" for Confucians. The implication in "Youzuo" that Heaven can be fickle, and that an individual's talent and virtue do not by themselves guarantee success, is hard to reconcile with Xunzi's philosophy as it is presented in the more reliable chapters of the book. In Xunzi's narration of the story, however, Confucius makes a different point, namely, that success and failure depend on one's position and oppor tunities, and that many virtuous heroes of the past were undone by circumstances beyond their control. As Makeham shows, such counsel is typical of versions of the tale from the third century b.c. onwards.
The lesson recorded in "Qiongda yi shi" is not situated between Chen and Cai-nor is it even attributed to Confucius-but the language and argument contain striking echoes of Xunzi's account. Both texts mention the example of Wu Zixu 伍子胥. Similarly, "Qiongda yi shi" says: "Whether one meets or does not meet [with opportunity] depends on Heaven" (遇不遇，天也);80 this phrase recurs in the Xunzi almost verbatim: "Whether one meets or does not meet [with opportunity] depends on time" (遇不遇者，時也).81 Again, "Qiongda yi shi" says:
有其人，亡其世，雖賢弗行矣。
If there is the right person, but not the right generation, then even one who is talented will not succeed.82 the version in Xunzi says:
今有其人不遇其時，雖賢，其能行乎?
If the right person does not meet with the right time, then will even one who is talented be able to succeed?83
These and other similarities indicate that if the account in the Xunzi is not modeled after "Qiongda yi shi," the two must share a common source or sources. Recalling that "Qiongda yi shi" never refers to Confucius's difficulties between Chen and Cai, perhaps we may say that Xunzi was the first writer to combine this teaching about timeliness with the famous legend that we know from Analects 15.2-where, as we have seen, the figure of Confucius gives a very different response to Zilu.84 The lines of transmission among these texts are blurry; many of the historical examples in "Qiongda yi shi" do not appear in Xunzi's account but are included in the Han-Shi waizhuan and Shuoyuan, despite the fact that the latter two are probably later than Finally, we speculated above that Xunzi may have been inspired by a saying in "Ziyi" ("The people take the ruler as their mind. . . .") while formulating his unique philosophy of mind. The editorial group from the Jingmen Municipal Museum has pointed out a specific case where Xunzi's language appears to be based on that of the Guodian manuscripts.85 "Zhongxin zhi dao" says:
忠之為道也，百工不楛。
With the Way of Integrity, the many artisans do not make slipshod wares.86
Compare the following statement by Xunzi: 如是，則百工莫不忠信而不楛矣。 If things are as above, then among the many artisans, none will fail to have integrity and trustworthiness, and they will not make slipshod wares.87 I expect that as we come to understand the Guodian manuscripts more deeply, we will find many more such correspondences, both philosophical and literary, with the writing of Xunzi.88
Differences between the Philosophy of Xunzi and that of the Guodian Manuscripts
Since the similarities between the worldview of the Guodian manuscripts and that of Xunzi are profound and pervasive, it is important not to overlook the differences between the two.
First, Xunzi addresses a great number of philosophical issues that 88. Li Zehou, "Chudu Guodian zhujian," 421, suggests another possible parallel in "Qiongda yi shi," strip 1; Guodian Chumu zhujian, 145: "There is Heaven and there is man; there is a division between Heaven and man" (有天有人，天人有分). This is reminiscent of Xunzi's concept of the distinction between Heaven and man. See, for example, his reference in Xunzi jijie, "Tianlun" 天論, 11.308, to "those who are enlightened with respect to the division between Heaven and man" (明於天人之分). Similarly, Wang Bo, "Guanyu 'Tang Yu zhi dao' de jige wenti" 關於唐虞之道的幾個 問題, Zhongguo zhexue shi 1999.2, 32, argues that the discussion of abdication in Xunzi jijie, "Zhenglun" 正論, 12.331-36, may have been written in response to views like those expressed in "Tang Yu zhi dao." the Guodian manuscripts do not even broach. The "Zhengming" 正名 chapter, for example, lays down an intricate theory of naming that has attracted modern linguists and analytical philosophers as a valuable meditation on the philosophy of language.89 his work also contains a sophisticated consideration of famous ancient paradoxes-such as "eggs have hair" (卵有毛)-90 and a sustained discussion of the reasons for rejecting this kind of sophistry.91 While the authors of the Guodian manuscripts are also keenly aware of the persuasive power of language and literature, their writings, as we have them, do not treat of such subjects as the appropriateness of names, the fallacies of falsidical paradoxes , and the relationship between language and the Way.
Similarly, another well-known feature of Xunzi's philosophy is his excoriation of theurgists, omen-seekers, and purveyors of supernatural theories. In "Tianlun," Xunzi articulates a distinction between what he calls "material anomalies" (物之罕至) or "transformations of yin and yang" (陰陽之化) on the one hand, and "human portents" (人祅) on the other. The former-such as screaming trees and falling stars-are essentially innocuous and inscrutable; they have occurred in all periods of history, and have never exercised a decisive influence on human affairs. The latter, however, are "to be feared" (可畏). Examples of "human portents" are poor plowing, hoeing and weeding out of season, or governmental injustice: in other words, willful actions, undertaken by unenlightened human beings, that violate the order of the Way and spell disaster for the entire nation.92 Xunzi's point is that if we must look for omens, we will find them not in the skies, but in our own deeds-for it is we, and not Heaven, who forge our own destinies. While this manner of thinking is not incompatible with the conception of Heaven in "Cheng zhi wen zhi," none of the Guodian manuscripts incor porate the distinctive idea of "material anomalies" and "human portents." That seems to be a purely Xunzian innovation.
Finally, Xunzi uses his paradigm of rituals and the Way to attack other provinces of philosophical debate. In "Yibing" 議兵 (Discussion of warfare) for example, Xunzi declares that the victor in any battle will not be the side with the superior tactics or weaponry, but the side that has cultivated the rituals more assiduously:
The weapons of the ancients were nothing more than halberd, spear, bow, and arrow, but enemy states recoiled without contest. Fortifications and battlements were not managed,93 pits and moats were not dug,94 strongholds and fortresses were not planted, machinery and surprise tactics not brought to bear; however, that the state, in peace, did not fear foreigners and was secure95-there was no other reason for this, than that [the rulers] were enlightened with respect to the Way and divided the [responsibilities] of the people equitably.96
In effect, then, military science is viewed as one of the many areas in which the consequences of the Way can be worked out rationally and systematically. The "Discussion of warfare" is not really about warfare at all; it merely uses the example of warfare to demonstrate the unparalleled efficacy of the rituals and the Way.97
This example highlights a critical difference between Xunzi and the Guodian manuscripts. The latter may discuss various ideas-such as human nature, learning, music, and the Way-that are also fundamental to Xunzi's outlook, but in these earlier documents, those themes are not yet woven together to form an integral system. Rather, they appear to be a congeries of typically Confucian, but not apodictically inter related, approaches to moral philosophy. For Xunzi, by contrast, all topics in philosophy are but aspects or reflections of the Way in its infinite applicability. Xunzi is an absolutist: he must believe that his reason is right reason, because his very philosophy is predicated on the conviction that there is only one Way. In that respect, Xunzi's views on diverse subjectslanguage, warfare, ritual-are predetermined by his commitment to the Way as the Heaven-ordained plan and pattern of nature, the infallible standard of reason and conduct. This systematic absolutism seems to be another uniquely Xunzian characteristic. 
Conclusion: Who Wrote the Confucian Manuscripts from Guodian?
Since several of the Guodian manuscripts can be shown to anticipate Xunzi in so many respects, it is worthwhile to ask who may have written them. (At this point, it is important to reiterate that the philosophical positions outlined above are not exemplified by all of the Guodian manuscripts. Therefore, in what follows I do not consider the three Laozi texts, "Taiyi sheng shui" 太一生水, or "Wuxing.") 98 The above discussion touched on one important clue, namely the tenet that "humanity" (仁) is internal and "morality" (義) external. To my knowledge, there are only two places in the received literature where this position is espoused. First, it is attributed to the philosopher Gaozi 告子 in his celebrated debate with Mencius (recorded in Mencius 6A); and second, it appears in a curious fragment now included in the "Jie" 戒 chapter of the Guanzi 管子,99 which, as A.C. Graham has demonstrated, is probably "a surviving document of the school of Gaozi."100 Therefore, it is reasonable as a first hypothesis to suppose that the Guodian manuscripts may have something to do with Gaozi or the branch of Confucianism that he repre sents.101 "Liude" gives a unique and coherent explanation of the principle that humanity is internal and morality external. The text starts by assigning six separate virtues to the six cardinal social roles. Morality (義) pertains to the lord (君), integrity (忠) to the subject (臣), wisdom (智) to the husband (夫), trustworthiness (信) to the wife (婦), sagehood (聖) to the father (父), and humanity (仁) to the son (子).102 then we read: 仁，內也。義，外也。禮樂，共也。內立父、子、夫也，外立 君、臣、婦也…為父絕君，不為君絕父。為昆弟絕妻，不為妻 絕昆弟。為宗族殺朋友，不為朋友殺宗族。 Humanity is internal; morality is external; ritual and music are shared. Inside are established the father, the son, and the husband; outside are established the lord, the subject, and the wife. In other words, when the text says that humanity is internal and morality external, it means that when moral dilemmas arise, the social role pertaining to humanity is to be privileged over the social role per-taining to morality. We protect our clan members before we protect "outside" relations. This idea is clearly in line with Analects 13.18:106 葉公語孔子曰﹕吾黨有直躬者，其父攘羊，而子證之。孔子曰﹕ 吾黨之直者異於是，父為子隱，子為父隱，直在其中矣。 The Lord of She said to Confucius: "In our village there is one upright Gong. His father stole a sheep, so the son testified against him." Confucius said: "The upright people of my village are different from this. The fathers are willing to conceal their sons; the sons are willing to conceal their fathers. uprightness lies therein."107 "upright Gong" should have known that his obligations to his father outweigh his obligations to his lord.
Is this what Gaozi meant when he said that humanity is internal and morality external? Perhaps-but nowhere in Mencius 6A does he make an argument even remotely resembling this one. On the contrary, his justification of his famous tenet is shown by Mencius to be thoroughly untenable. Gaozi argues that morality is external because we naturally venerate people who are older than ourselves, and the fact that they are older is an objective circumstance external to ourselves. So moral behavior is determined by factors outside the self. Mencius responds, compellingly, that our tendency to venerate our elders is actually internal-for we do not venerate aged horses, only aged humans. We decide when and where "age" is a factor that we must take into account in moral behavior. The significance of age is subjective. 108 However, the figure of Gaozi is deliberately made out to be a fool by the editors of the Mencius, and it is probable that his real arguments (or those of his group) were never incorporated into the received text. Therefore, Gaozi's naïve argument in Mencius 6A.4 need not dissuade us from associating the Guodian manuscripts with his philosophical outlook. Indeed, "Cheng zhi wen zhi" and "Xing zi ming chu" shed great light on an enigmatic passage in the debate between Mencius and Gaozi: Gaozi is presenting a definition of xing like that of "Xing zi ming chu" and "Cheng zhi wen zhi": xing is the name that we use to denote the inborn character istics shared by all members of a single species. Mencius simply cannot accept Gaozi's definition of xing, because of his own peculiar usage that we have examined above. This is why he raises the issue of the dog's xing and the ox's xing: in his worldview, xing refers to the special characteristic that distinguishes one species from all others. As far as Mencius is concerned, by asserting that "what is inborn is called xing" (生之謂性), Gaozi is effectively denying that there is a fundamental difference between human beings and animals. Thus the issue is a matter of defini tion, not a matter of philosophy. The debate is best understood as a scholastic dispute: Gaozi stands for a group that understands the keyword xing in a manner intolerable to Mencius. (And the Guodian manuscripts suggest that it may have been Mencius's usage of xing, and not that of Gaozi or Xunzi, which was considered unorthodox in ancient times.)
Similarly, Mencius's disciple Gongduzi 公都子 seems to attribute a position to Gaozi that is explicitly avowed by "Zun deyi": 公都子曰﹕告子曰﹕性無善無不善也。或曰﹕性可以為善，可 以為不善，是故文武興則民好善，幽厲興則民好暴。 Gongduzi said: "Gaozi said: 'There is no inherent goodness or lack of goodness in the xing.' Some say: 'The xing can be made to be good and can be made to be not good. Thus when Kings Wen and Wu arose, the people were fond of goodness; when Kings You and Li arose, the people were fond of violence.'"111 "Zun deyi" (manifestly following the lead of "Ziyi") agrees that people are, by nature, morally indeterminate; they simply take on the characteristics exhibited by their ruler.
桀不謂其民必亂，而民有為亂矣。
Jie did not tell his people that they must be disorderly, but the people became disorderly.112 下之事上也，不從其所命，而從其所行。上好是物也，下必有 甚焉者。 In serving their superiors, inferiors do not follow their commandments , but follow their conduct. If the superiors are fond of a thing, there must be those among their inferiors who outdo them in that regard.113
There is another historical figure with whom the Guodian manuscripts can be plausibly associated: this is Gongsun Nizi 公孫尼子, a native of chu who is sometimes said to be the author of "Ziyi,"114 and whose works are listed in the Hanshu 漢書 bibliography as comprising twenty-eight chapters.115 unfortunately, we know even less about Gongsun Nizi than we do about Gaozi; it is not even clear when he lived.116 We are told by some commentators that he was the compiler of the "Yueji" 樂記, but there are several reasons why it is doubtful that this can refer to the extant chapter of that name in the Liji.117 A more plausible speculation, I think, is that Gongsun Nizi wrote a lost essay about music, which may have ultimately contributed to the philosophical view that informs the received "Yueji." It is not farfetched to view "Xing zi ming chu" as a possible remnant of Gongsun Nizi's tradition. 118 There is one other useful reference to Gongsun Nizi from ancient times: Wang Chong 王充 (a.d. 27-ca. 100) places him in the same cate gory as certain other early Confucians who believed that the xing contains both goodness and evil in it, and that human beings can be made to augment one or the other aspect of their natures.119 This position is similar to that attributed to Gaozi in Mencius 6A-which Wang Chong also discusses.120 Not coincidentally, it is also very much like the position that Xunzi defends with incomparably greater sophistication. This is not to suggest that those Guodian manuscripts which anticipate Xunzi were necessarily written by Gaozi or Gongsun Nizi. Indeed, it is not impossible that these names refer to fictitious characters who never even lived. However, I believe that the philosophical positions sketchily attributed to these two figures correspond well to what we read in the Guodian manuscripts. It cannot be a coincidence that the "humanity is internal, morality is external" apophthegm is elsewhere attributed to Gaozi and to no one else-just as it cannot be a coincidence that "Ziyi" is attributed to Gongsun Nizi of Chu, whose doctrinal views, as outlined by Wang Chong, fit with "Xing zi ming chu" and the other manuscripts like it. Gaozi and Gongsun Nizi, therefore, are best understood as names representing a distinct branch within the Confucian tradition,121 the same branch that produced such texts as "Xing zi ming chu," "Liude," and "Cheng zhi wen zhi." Their platform, insofar as it can be reconstructed, is as follows:122 4. Music is especially useful in the project of self-cultivation, because the sounds and tones of appropriate music can inspire human beings to emulate the virtues expressed in them.
In conclusion, it is evident that Xunzi's thought did not arise ex nihilo, and we now have a better view than before of the intellectual world from which he emerged.123 His positions may be more systematically argued than anything to be found in the Guodian manuscripts, but there can be little question that he was influenced by the same doctrinal sect. One can imagine that these texts were what Xunzi learned in school.
123. As recently as 1997, when "Wuxing" was known only from Mawangdui, it was possible for Riegel, "Eros, Introversion, and the Beginnings of Shijing Commen tary," 145n.5, to suppose that "the Wu-hsing p'ien version of early confucian Innerlich keit clearly owes a conceptual debt to Xunzi." Now it is obvious that the debt is the other way around. This is just one example of the many respects in which our understanding of early Confucianism will have to be revised in the light of the Guodian manuscripts.
